Most of the European Member States employ anti-loss trafficking rules. They aim to prevent the acquisition of mere corporate shells with high tax loss carryforwards for the tax asset to be utilized in profitable companies. However, other corporations can unintentionally be affected by the anti-abuse regulations if there is a change in ownership or activity. The transfer restrictions have been argued to impair start-up financing, as investors are faced with the risk of losing accumulated loss carryforwards in the corporation upon the entering of new or the capital increase of existing investors.
Tax Law and the Transfer of Start-up Losses: A European Overview and Categorization

Introduction
Loss trafficking, i.e. the acquisition of shell companies with significant tax loss carryforwards but without any economic activity for no other purpose than the transfer of tax loss carryforwards, is widely deemed abusive. The majority of the European Member States have anti-loss trafficking restrictions in place to counter such transactions, relying on criteria such as a change in ownership or activity. The reasoning behind it relates to the notion that decision-making should not be (exclusively) motivated by tax considerations. However, the reliance on general criteria to identify so-deemed abusive deals has the potential to affect other transactions as well.
Economically, these restrictions result in external investors not being able to offset their losses.
Being forced to forfeit loss carryforwards means losing a tax shield that could have led to substantial tax savings in the future, thus reducing the value of the corporation. As a result, denying the transfer of loss carryforwards could entice investors to refrain from funding risky projects.
External financing is particularly important for start-ups, since they are often financially constrained. They have not yet been able to build up financial reserves and do only have insufficient collateral to obtain bank credits (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b , 2002a Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009; Da Rin, Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006) . Small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important part of the economy, accounting for almost 100% of businesses in the European Union (EU) and providing a considerable portion of overall employment (European Commission, 2018) . Especially innovative start-ups are considered an important driver of innovation. Fostering an attractive environment for entrepreneurship is therefore important for a country's economy and advancement. Restricting the possibilities to offset losses and, as a result, increasing the risk for investors could jeopardize this goal. Possible negative effects could entail difficulties to obtain start-up financing or disincentives to go public.
The objective of this study is firstly to examine anti-tax loss trafficking rules across the EU28 Member States from 2000 to 2018. While temporal restrictions on losses such as tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards have already been investigated in the theoretical and empirical literature, this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide a comprehensive overview over restrictions of the transfer of tax loss carryforwards and their development over time.
The regulations concern a narrow part of corporate tax law and are, if even mentioned, only described on a very general basis in tax databases commonly used in research. The data was collected using tax guides, supplemented by other studies and appended by referring directly to national tax law. The design of anti-tax loss trafficking rules is heterogeneous across the EU28 Member States, with a wide range of conditions and exceptions. Therefore, in a second part, the restrictions will be categorized to construct a more comparable variable. The strictness of anti-tax loss trafficking regulations could influence the decision-making of founders and investors, thus impacting the attractiveness of the EU28 Member States (as well as the EU as a whole) as a location for innovative businesses. The results can provide guidance for policy makers by giving them the opportunity to explore alternative designs enacted in other countries. Investors can compare the ranking of the different regulations and their restrictiveness in the EU28 Member States that are of interest to them. The newly created variable can also be used for future research on the topic.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the treatment of tax losses with a focus on adverse effects it could potentially have on start-up development. Chapter 3 discusses the reasoning behind restrictions of tax loss transfers. Chapter 4 reviews empirical literature in the field. Chapter 5 examines different aspects of anti-tax loss trafficking regulations across the EU28 Member States. Chapter 6 categorizes the regulations. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes.
Start-ups and tax loss restrictions
While a lot of public attention and research focuses on multinational corporations, SMEs account for a considerable part of the economic activity and growth. According to the 2018 annual report on European SMEs, they significantly contributed to the recovery after the financial crisis. 99.8% of non-financial businesses in the EU are categorized as SMEs, providing 66.4% of overall employment in the sector (European Commission, 2018) . Young and innovative companies are considered the driver of a country's technological and economic progress.
Start-ups often suffer from credit constraints as they lack sufficient collateral (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b , 2002a Cosh et al., 2009; Da Rin et al., 2006) . Market failures such as externalities and information asymmetries aggravate this problem (Mina, Lahr, & Hughesy, 2013 , Crawford & Freedman, 2010 , leading to suboptimal investment in innovative projects (García-Quevedo, Segarra-Blasco, & Teruel, 2018) . Venture capital (VC) funds bridge the funding gap with private equity. They typically support innovative ventures in their start-up phase and aim to exit after a number of years, mostly via a sale of the start-up or an initial public offering (IPO) (Schwienbacher, 2008) . Apart from the loosening of financing constraints, venture capitalists provide additional support and guidance to start-ups, helping them to realize their full potential (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Lerner, 1994) .
Therefore a vital VC market plays an important role in the development of start-ups and innovation.
In their initial stage, most start-ups invest into their projects without generating corresponding income, resulting in an overall loss (EY, 2013) . Losses are treated asymmetrically for tax purposes. While profits are taxed immediately, losses can only be deducted against past (loss carryback) or future profits (loss carryforward), often subject to temporal or relative constraints.
If the tax code allows for loss carrybacks, the taxpayer can offset current losses with past profits and claim a tax refund or tax credit. Remaining losses are to be carried forward and can be offset against future profits. Depending on the national regulations (see Bräutigam, Spengel and Stutzenberger (Bräutigam, Spengel, & Stutzenberger, 2017) for an overview), loss carrybacks as well as carryforwards can be limited in time or amount. Some countries limit the deductible amount to a percentage of the current income or a percentage of the total amount of loss carryforwards, others provide absolute thresholds, or a combination of both. Losses are usually carried forward at their nominal value, i.e. they are not adjusted for inflation or the time value of money. Therefore, unused losses effectively loose in economic value the longer they are carried forward. These loss regulations alone already discriminate against start-up investment, as the loss relief cannot be immediately claimed. Instead, in contrast to mature firms that can consolidate with other investments that already generate positive taxable income, start-ups have to wait until their project turns profitable to be able to benefit from accumulated losses (Crawford & Freedman, 2010) .
Besides temporal restrictions on the offset of losses within a company, another important aspect of tax loss provisions concerns the transfer of losses between incorporated entities. Anti-loss trafficking rules can lead to the forfeiture of accumulated loss carryforwards in certain cases, such as a change in activity or a change in ownership (for more details, please refer to chapter 5). While these regulations are designed as anti-abuse measures to prevent the tax-driven acquisition of loss-making companies without any real activities, it has been argued that they distort investment, especially in case of start-up financing.
The above-mentioned tax loss provisions might prevent investors from funding start-up research and development (R&D) expenditure ifdue to the regulations potentially worthlesslosses have accumulated (Haufler, Norbäck, & Persson, 2014) . First, loss transfer restrictions might negatively affect the financing decision of investors. Considering that the expenditure might not be tax-deductible later on, they might decide to forego or reduce the investment in a start-up. Second, they might also decrease the probability and price of acquisitions or IPOs in the exit case. Corporations could be reluctant to go public if, due to the change in the ownership structure after an exit, anti-loss trafficking rules might apply. Depending on the specific regulation, the loss carryforwards accumulated in the start-up cannot be used at all, or with strict limitations.
The potential distortions caused by tax loss restrictions likely differ in their severity depending on the design of the regulation. If investors and founders take anti-tax loss trafficking regulations into account when deciding where to locate and invest, the restrictions have real economic
consequences.
An exception to the denial of loss transfer between different corporate entities are group taxation regimes, where loss offset is allowed within a controlled group of companies via consolidation or loss compensation payments. However, as this study focuses on SMEs und start-ups outside of corporate groups, group taxation schemes will not be considered here.
Reasoning behind anti-tax loss transfer regulations
Reasons often brought forward to argue for the restriction of tax loss transfers relate to the notion that only the person incurring the tax loss should reap its benefits (Donnelly & Young, 2002; Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015) . However, pressing for the forced forfeiture of tax loss carryforwards after a change in ownership ignores that the denial may well lead to the new shareholders not being able to use the loss carryforwards, but it also denies the off-set for the old shareholders. Investors are thus not compensated for the investment they lost. As a result, the regulation aiming to restrict the benefits of loss carryforwards to its so-deemed rightful owner ends up denying the deduction altogether.
It is also voiced that it should only be allowed to set off losses if the activity that gave rise to them is continued (Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015; Poitevin, 2003) . The restriction to a similar or the same activity is said to encourage a corporation to continue loss-making activities in order to maintain loss carryforwards (Hoenig, 2014) . According to Nijhawan (2015) , this incentive is not set if the restriction not just requires the activity to be continued, but also allows the set-off of loss carryforwards only against profits from said activity. However, Hoenig (2014) states that, considering other regulations in tax law, it seems arbitrary to restrict the use of loss carryforwards to activities that gave rise to it while a taxpayer's income is usually calculated based on the net of all of his activities.
One of the major arguments alleged for the regulations relates to the principle of tax neutrality.
The principle requires that taxes do not affect decision-making. Denying the transfer of losses is argued to prevent transactions which are driven entirely by tax considerations and do not have any real economic reason other than the offset of losses. Even so, the allowance of tax loss carryforwards itself is borne out of efforts to mitigate the asymmetric treatment of profits and losses. The forfeiture of tax loss carryforwards thus does not improve but impair the neutrality of the tax system. Additionally, Poitevin (2003) brings forward the argument that, if loss carryforwards are transferable, firms in financial distress can use them as a collateral to obtain external financing, reducing imperfections in financial markets. Secondly, Hoenig (2014) calls in question why tax-driven transactions should even be considered undesirable in the context of loss trafficking. He points out that it should not make a difference whether a corporation's shareholders recoup their suffered losses by setting them off themselves ore being compensated through acquisition prices. That said, while it is at a state's discretion to circumvent transactions that are deemed to be abusive, trade sales and public offers of start-ups will generally not fulfill this scope, but they can still be affected by the restrictions.
Denying the use of loss carryforward transfers introduces distortions due to its limitation to corporations. In partnerships, the transparency principle leads to the apportionment of losses to the respective partners; they can be set off against other income of the individuals. In corporations, the separation principle causes the loss to be trapped at the level of the corporation; the shareholders are unable to utilize it outside of the corporate sphere. Due to the transfer restriction, they are not even able to be compensated for the losses after the sale of the corporation, leading to asymmetric distribution of risk between partnerships and corporations. In partnerships, investors are able to set off the resulting tax loss carryforwards against profits from other investments if the company is unsuccessful. In corporations, the investment is ultimately lost if the start-up is not turning profitable.
All in all, while anti-loss trafficking rules targeted at the so-deemed abusive transfer of tax loss carryforwards can, unintentionally, negatively affect corporate start-ups. Most companies seeking external finance will choose to incorporate (Crawford & Freedman, 2010) . Restricting the transfer of loss carryforwards increases the risk for investor and discriminates against corporate start-ups, thus possibly leading to distortions in financing, legal form and location decisions.
Seedtable's list of "100 European Start-ups to watch in 2019" 1 is comprised entirely of corporations, indicating a substantial share of incorporated entities in the European high-tech startup ecosystem and therefore a potentially high relevance of loss transfer restrictions.
Empirical evidence
To the best of our knowledge there exists no empirical study investigating the effect of anti-tax loss trafficking rules. There is, however, an increasing literature relating to the effects of temporal loss restrictions such as tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards.
It has been shown that the permission of loss carrybacks, i.e. the loosening of tax loss restrictions, can lead to overinvestment and delay the exit of unprofitable firms (Bethmann, Jacob, & Muller, 2018) . Similarly, the existence of loss carryforwards (Auerbach & Poterba, 1987) and the limitation of carryforward periods, i.e. the tightening of tax loss restrictions, has been shown to decrease investment incentives (Dreßler & Overesch, 2013) . Dreßler and Overesch (2013) Focusing on start-ups, Mintz (1988) finds that, due to the uncertainty of the future profits and concomitant uncertainty about the value of current losses, they face a significantly higher potential tax rate than other firms in the same industry. In a subsequent paper, Cooper and Knittel (2010) add to those results. When comparing new to established firms, on average the results show higher losses and lower loss utilization rates as well as higher expected tax rates. They conclude that especially new firms and certain industries are disproportionally affected by the negative effects of asymmetric tax loss treatment. Due to their inability to immediately pool tax losses with profitable projects, start-ups face a far higher risk of not being able to deduct their investments (Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2011) . Similarly, other research shows that especially small companies that would be eligible for loss offset do not claim their refund due to tax complexity (Zwick, 2018) .
Taken together, the empirical literature suggests that tax loss regulations matter, and they matter more for young compared to mature companies. While more restrictive loss provisions might reduce overinvestment and mitigate concerns with respect to the delayed exit of unprofitable companies, they discriminate against risky investments. This disproportionally hits small and newly established firms. Transferring the conclusions drawn in the area of temporal tax loss 8 restrictions to anti-tax loss trafficking rules, the possible distortions addressed in the previous chapter are likely to predominantly affect SMEs and start-ups.
Transfer of tax losses in the EU28 Member States
The majority of EU28 Member States have introduced specific anti-abuse rules targeting sodeemed abusive transfer of tax losses. While the design of the national regulations shows great heterogeneity across countries, they share similar elements. 2 Estonia and Latvia occupy a special position due to the unique features of their tax law. Corporate taxes are only levied on profit distributions; tax loss carryforwards or carrybacks are not relevant in this system.
Change in ownership
A change in shareholding can trigger the anti-abuse regulation. As such, the regulation only concerns acquisitions conducted as share deals; in asset deals, the tax loss carryforwards generally remain with the corporation that incurred the loss. If the restrictions are tied to changes in shareholding, not just the sale of the corporation but any substantial investment resulting in a change in the ownership structure could pose a threat to accumulated loss carryforwards within a start-up. What constitutes a harmful change in ownership differs depending on the national regulation ( Figure 1 ). While seven of the EU28 Member States that rely on this criteria refer to changes in control or majority (commonly assumed to be fulfilled upon the transfer of more than 50% of a company's shares), others clearly specify minimum thresholds ranging from of 25% (e.g.
Czech Republic) to 75% (e.g. Austria). Just three countries employ the anti-abuse rules already for change in ownership below 50%.
The German regulations in place since 2008 lead to the pro rata denial of loss carryforwards upon a change in ownership between 25 and 50% and a full denial from 50%. However, in 2017
the German Federal Constitutional Court has declared the pro rata regulations unconstitutional (Decision from 29.3.2017, 2 BvL 6/11). In the Czech Republic, the company has to prove that at least 80% of its revenue is generated by the same activity that was conducted during the time the tax losses in question were assessed, otherwise a harmful change in activity is assumed. Spain links it to different or an additional group of activities (based on the national classification of economic activities) that generate revenue exceeding 50% of the average turnover of the previous two years. France and Greece rely on changes in turnover of more than 50% compared to the preceding year due to additional or ceased activities, with France allowing the average number of employees and the gross value of fixed assets as alternative criteria. The Netherlands define a harmful change in activity as a decrease in the original activities to less than 30%. Relevant factors to determine the activity of a corporation depend on the industry and include employment, turnover and assets. 
Exemptions
Overview
To ensure that the anti-loss trafficking restrictions affect cases that are considered abusive but exclude transactions that are not targeted, regulators have introduced exemptions for specific cases (Figure 4 ). These escape clauses will be discussed in detail in the following sub-chapters.
Overall, exemptions are provided for reorganizations in response to financial distress or the availability of hidden reserves. Transactions within groups where the ultimate owner remains can be disregarded, too, as well as changes in the ownership structure of quoted companies.
Some countries provide the opportunity to bring forward evidence of economic and financial reasons to refute the abuse assumption. The regulations mentioned are explicitly stated in the Taken together, the exemptions for recovery display similar features. One shared objective is the safeguard of jobs, where the specific demands tied to this aim can differ between the countries depending on the wording of the regulation and administrative practice.
Hidden reserves
After criticism from the industry as well as the scientific community regarding the excessive nature of its anti-loss trafficking regulation, Germany added exceptions, amongst them the so- 
Quoted companies
Quoted companies have limited influence on the trading of their shares on public stock markets. In the Netherlands, the regulations include a provision according to which regular trading does not lead to an extinction of loss carryforwards, as long as the company could not have known that a significant change in ownership took place.
Groups
Restructuring within a group might result in a change in the direct ownership structure while the ultimate holding remains unaffected. Such transactions are excluded from the scope of the anti-avoidance regulations in nine countries. What constitutes a group differs from country to country.
The German "Konzernklausel" (group clause) restricts the application of the anti-abuse clause to changes with less than 100% direct or indirect shareholding chains. Great Britain, Ireland and Cyprus just require a 75% ownership relation for the non-application. The Dutch fiscal authorities do not apply the restrictions on loss carryforwards if the harmful change in ownership can be attributed to a shareholder that, directly or indirectly, already held at least one third of the shares before the transaction. Similarly, in Finland changes within the ownership structure of a group are amongst the reasons accepted to obtain permission to use loss carryforwards.
A company belongs to a group if a limited company exercises dominant influence over it, usually determined based on the absolute voting majority. Italy also relies on the concept of control, regularly achieved by direct or indirect holdings in excess of 50% of the share capital.
In Sweden and Denmark, changes of ownership are determined at the parent level. Therefore, restructuring within a group does not trigger the regulation as long as it does not affect the ultimate share holding. Swedish groups are build by decisive influence over other companies, typically achieved by holding more than half of the voting rights or otherwise exerting control.
Denmark only requires a minimum shareholding of 25%. In those cases, solely changes in ownership of the ultimate parent results in the forfeiture of loss carryforwards.
Evidence of economic and financial justifications
Five countries explicitly provide the opportunity to justify changes in the ownership structure or activity. Belgium refers to legitimate reasons of financial or economic nature, Finland to a necessity for the continuation of the company's business. In Portugal, a request can be made to the Ministry of Finance (before changes in ownership or activity triggering the regulation take place) in special cases of economic interest. Sweden may grant exemptions if the change in ownership has socio-economic significance and would not take place if the exemption would not be granted. However, this option is applied very restrictively.
Relevance of exemptions for start-ups
The exemptions summarized above apply to companies of all sizes and ages. One major reason for the re-introduction of the activity criteria in Germany in 2016 was the relief of restrictions on start-ups (Berger & Tetzlaff, 2019) . However, the wording of the tax law now includes all companies to avoid illegal state aid cases. Similarly, to the best of our knowledge, none of the EU28 Member States, except for Italy, employs exemptions specifically limited to start-ups.
Since 2017, young Italian companies have the possibility to transfer all tax losses incurred in their first three fiscal years of activity to a listed corporation that has at least 20% shareholding in the start-up. The price paid to the start-up for the transferred loss carryforwards is not included in its taxable income, i.e. it is received tax-free. Other than that, start-ups have to rely on the general rules to utilize their loss carryforwards.
The exemptions for recovery, quoted companies and groups will regularly be of little relevance to start-ups. While they are often financially constraint, changes in ownership or activity do not occur due to financial distress but are part of strategic decisions in the development process of the start-up. Privately held start-ups cannot make use of the exclusion of listed corporations. In addition, start-ups that have been established independently will not benefit from the group exemption. While there are start-ups that have been founded as a spin-off of a regular company and are thus part of a corporate group, this particular group will not be as dependent on external investors as they can rely on funding from within their group.
While the hidden reserve clauses seem, at first glance, beneficial for start-ups, their applicability is limited. Hidden reserves are commonly defined as the difference between book and market value tied to material or immaterial business assets of the company. Start-ups that have yet not been able to build up any hidden reserves on their assets will not be able to exploit the exemption. The determination and pricing of self-generated goodwill will prove to be difficult, if at all accepted as hidden reserve within the meaning of the national law. Sweden's amount limitation rule provides leeway in a sense that hidden reserves do not have to be realized per se, but instead are assumed to be compensated for in the purchase price.
For start-ups without the ability to set off hidden reserves, the remaining option is to bring forward evidence of financial and economic reasons to refute the abuse assumption. This entails administrative efforts and therefore costs that are imposed on the company.
Categorization of anti-loss trafficking regulations
As apparent from the preceding overview, the design of the regulations varies greatly across the EU28 Member States. Despite this heterogeneity, a classification into broad categories can be undertaken based on the strictness of the regulations. The easier it is to maintain loss carryforwards despite changes in activity or ownership, the more lenient the restriction.
The absence of anti-loss trafficking rules is classified as the most lenient Category 0. In those cases, there is no explicitly codified restriction on the deduction of tax loss carryforwards after a change in ownership or activity.
In case of explicit regulations, abuse is blanketly assumed based on codified criteria. The burden of proof of the opposite rests upon the taxpayer. In those cases, the cumulative requirement of a change in activity and ownership is the least restrictive measure. As both criteria have to be fulfilled, the forfeiture of loss carryforwards can be avoided if the start-up's business activity is maintained (and properly documented) for the required periods, even if a new investor enters or existing investors increase their stake in the enterprise. On the other hand, an adjustment in the business strategy to account for changing preferences or to gain access to a new customer base will not lead to unintended negative tax consequences if it does not coincide with a change in the ownership structure.
The forfeiture of losses after a change in activity imposes a more serious restriction on startups than the cumulative requirement. Nevertheless, as summarized in chapter 5.2, most countries rely on broad definitions of a corporation's activity. While this lack of guidance may lead to legal uncertainty, it also gives corporations leeway in avoiding the application of the restriction. Changes in activity will generally have to be far reaching in order to trigger the regulations. As long as the corporation maintains its activities, investments, trade sales and IPOs do not lead to the forfeiture of loss carryforwards.
Compared to activity-based clauses, anti-abuse regulations solely relying on a change in ownership are more restrictive. Within this category, any substantial investment (and in some countries, even a capital increase from existing shareholders) could pose a threat to accumulated loss carryforwards within a start-up. If the corporation plans to go public, they will have to take into account the value of its accumulated loss carryforwards that will be lost in the process. The precisely defined thresholds do not leave any room for interpretation once they have been crossed.
Anti-abuse regulations either relying on a change in ownership or a change in activity fall in the most restrictive category. The fulfillment of each criteria on its own (and, of course, if they are reached cumulatively) leads to the forfeiture of a corporation's loss carryforwards.
Based on this reasoning, four categories are defined as follows: Other elements that could be used to categorize the regulations have been discussed in chapter 5. However, a more fine-grained classification would inflate the number of categories and defeat the purpose of such a measure. Instead, the other elements could be included in an empirical specification as separate variables. Country 2000 Country 2001 Country 2002 Country 2003 Country 2004 Country 2005 Country 2006 Country 2007 Country 2008 Country 2009 Country 2010 Country 2011 Country 2012 Country 2013 Country 2014 Country 2015 Country 2016 3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3   BG  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 CY 3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 (2) Arguments against the trafficking of loss carryforwards are based on the notion that losses should be tied to a person or activity, or the principle of tax neutrality. However, the restrictions only affect corporations. Denying the transfer of losses prevents investors from recouping their unsuccessful investments, thus increasing their risk when investing in incorporated entities as compared to partnerships.
(3) European SMEs account for a considerable part of the economic activity and employment.
Young 
Only applies to companies that have reduced or terminated activity before the change in ownership. 13 Not legally codified, but practice based on court decisions. 14 Applies if participation was below 33% before capital increase. 15 Requirement not cumulative. The fulfillment of each criteria on its own triggers the regulation.
